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R i ch ard Barrett

M u c h of the research that has examined abortion in its
economic context has focused on measuring abortion demand,
the role that economic costs, like those imposed by
a b o r t i o n regulation, and demographics play in a woman's
d e c i s i o n to terminate her pregnancy.
Another aspect of the
a b o r t i o n d e c is ion amenable to economic analysis is w he n a
w o m a n has her procedure.
The National Abort ion Federation
argues that ab ortion regulations, in addition to deterring
a b o r t i o n regulations altogether, also cause a w om a n who
does elect ab ortion to delay when she actually has it, a
p r o b l e m a t i c effect giv en that the later in a pregn anc y an
a b o r t i o n is performed, the greater the medical risk.
This issue was examined using the economic theory of
fertility, w h i c h argues that the decision to have an
a b o r t i o n is m ad e by w eighing the costs and benefits of
h a v i n g an a b o rti on versus having a child.
It is
h y p o t h e s i z e d here that making this decision takes a certain
amount of time ; the time is determined by both h o w long it
takes to ga ther the information on the costs of abortion
an d h a v i n g the child as well as the degree of difference
b e t w e e n these costs.
U s i n g a logit model, this study estimated the
p r o b a b i l i t y that a w o man defers her abortion past the 12^^
w e e k LM P b a s e d on a set of economic and sociological
factors.
In the analysis, all the coefficients for the
eco nom ic variables were insignificant, implying that their
impact on abortion timing is minimal.
The three
s i gnificant results, TEEN, COLLEGEl, and PREVAB, all
r e p r e s e n t e d characteristics that illustrate a woman's
a b ili ty to gather the relevant abortion information.
In terms of the ab ort ion timing hypothesis, it appears that
what de termines w h e n a woma n has her abortion is not the
set of economic costs she faces but her ability to learn
about such costs.
What this suggests about state
regulat ion s that impose, at the very least, a time cost is
that they are un lik ely to lead w o me n to defer w h e n they
hav e the procedure.
However, given that a Mississippi
study indicates that regulations do result in deferral, the
ec onomic issue of a b o rt ion timing deserves further
research.
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CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION

Twenty-seven years ago,

Roe v. Wade recognized a

woman's right to an abortion based on the notion of the
"trimester f r a m e w o r k . W i t h i n this framework,

states were

restricted from regulating first-trimester abortions,

but

were allowed to regulate abortions in the later months of
p r e g n a n c y .^
In response to this ruling,

individual states began

regulating abortion in ways believed to be permissible
under Roe v . Wade;
to 1991,
place,

one such state was Pennsylvania.

Prior

Pennsylvania had three abortion regulations in

informed consent,

spousal notification,

and parental

consent.
Pennsylvania's informed consent statute mandated that,
at least 24 hours prior to performing the abortion,

a

physician provide a woman necessary medical information

^ See Appendix A for a comprehensive history of Supreme Court
decisions on reproductive issues.
^ Emanuel (1998-99) provides an overview of reproductive
constitutional law in the United States.

about the procedure and the estimated gestational age of
the fetus.

It also required an abortion provider or a

qualified abortion staff to provide a woman information on
non-abortion alternatives,
financial services.

such as adoption and available

Pennsylvania's spousal notification

provision required a married woman to sign a document
stating that she had notified her husband of her pending
a b o r t i o n .^

Finally,

the state's parental consent law

required either parent of a young woman under 18 to provide
informed consent in order for the teenager to have an
abortion.^
In 1991,

Planned Parenthood of Southeastern

Pennsylvania contested Pennsylvania's three abortion
regulations on the basis that they violated Roe v. Wade.
The Supreme Court's decision in this case upheld most of
Pennsylvania's regulations and,
"trimester framework."

in fact,

overruled the

States were then allowed to impose

abortion regulations in the first trimester so long as such
laws did not place an "undue burden" on a woman's ability
to choose to have an abortion.

^ This law included exceptions for both women whose pregnancy was
the result of sexual assault and for women who believed that
notifying their husbands would result in physical abuse.
^ The provision allowed for a "judicial bypass," by which a court
could authorize a young woman's abortion without her parent's
informed consent.

What constitutes an undue burden on a woman's right to
abort is certainly a litigious issue in the already
contentious abortion d e b a t e .

Yet,

in Penn. V. Casey,

the

Supreme Court gave clear examples of what they did and did
not consider an undue burden.

For example,

they ruled that

Pennsylvania's spousal notification law did impose an undue
restriction and overturned the decision on the basis that
it neglected to protect a woman who would potentially face
psychological abuse,
notifying her spouse.

rather than physical abuse, by
On the other hand,

the Court found

that both the parental consent and informed consent
statutes did not present an undue burden and, thus, upheld
these p r o v i s i o n s .^
Economists are studying the effects of state abortion
regulations by treating them as though they imposed an
economic cost and conducting demand analysis.

These

economic studies assess whether or not a woman is deterred
by either the costs associated with abortion laws and/or
other economic costs of abortion.

^ Appendix B provides the current status of all state mandatory
delay, informed consent, and parental consent laws as well as
present Medicaid funding r e s t ri c ti on s. Appendix C provides
Montana's current status of all abortion regulations.
Currently,
Montana does not impose either a parental consent or mandatory
waiting period restriction.
Also, Montana does not restrict
their use of state Medicaid funds to pay for abortions.

While consumer demand theory is useful in studying a
woman's abortion decision,

it is not limited to just the

study of whether or not a woman has the procedure.

It can

also be used to study the effect of state regulations on
the timing of abortion.
The National Abortion Federation

(NAP) argues that

state regulations like Pennsylvania's parental consent and
2 4 hour informed consent laws affect women who have
abortions by deferring when they have them.^
words,

In other

they argue these laws may cause a woman to have a

late abortion.

If this is so, the laws that were designed

to lessen the number of abortions are,

ironically,

also

increasing the gestational age of some terminated
pregnancies.
What is undesirable about this possible effect of
state abortion laws is that the medical risk and physical
pain associated with abortion increases as the gestational
age increases.

Through most of the first trimester,

abortion procedures are considered relatively safe and
u n c o m p l i c a t e d .^ However,
the first trimester,

as a pregnancy nears the end of

at around 13 weeks,

abortion becomes

^ This statement was obtained from the National Abortion
Federation website w w w. pr o c h o i c e .org/facts/afterl2w.html on June
15, 2000.
^ See Gold (1990) .

more problematic.

Specifically,

the risk of serious

abortion complications increases as abortions are performed
in the second trimester.
infection;

These complications include

uterine perforation;

hemorrhaging;

cervical laceration;

a missed abortion or "continued pregn anc y;"

postabortal syndrome^;

and death^'^*^.

Do economic factors, including the costs imposed by
state regulation, place a woman at greater medical risk by
deferring when she has her abortion?

This thesis will

address this question by using consumer demand theory,

the

same theory used to determine whether or not a woman has an
abortion at all, to determine the impact of economic
factors on the timing of the abortion decision.
This study will focus on women who had abortions in
Missoula,

Montana.

The reason for choosing this locale is

that Blue Mountain Clinic

(BMC), a Missoula based family

practice clinic that provides abortion services,

has made

survey data of their abortion clients available to this
study.

® Postabortal syndrome happens when the uterus does not properly
contract, preventing blood from leaving the uterus after the
abortion procedure.
^ The Alan Guttmacher Institute reports that the risk of death
associated with abortion increases with the length of pregnancy,
from 1 death for every 530,000 abortions at 8 or fewer weeks to 1
per 17,000 at 16-20 weeks and 1 per 6,000 at 21 or more weeks.
See website www .a gi -u s a. or g.
See The N ew Our Bodies, Ourselves (1992).

This study cannot directly assess the impact of
abortion restrictions on abortion timing due to the
limitations of the d a t a .

However,

it is possible toinfer

how a woman behaves when facing the costs imposed by
abortion regulation by looking at her response to other
economic costs.

This study will indirectly measure the

impact of regulation by treating regulation as another cost
associated with abortion services.

Thesis Organization
This thesis is organized as follows.

Chapter Two

reviews sociological and economic studies to build the
economic logic of the decision when to have an abortion.
Chapter Three describes the data and statistical model used
to study abortion timing.

Chapter Four presents results

and discusses the economic and policy implications of these
figures.

Chapter Five summarizes the findings and includes

suggestions for further research on the economics of
abortion timing.

In order to directly assess the effects of abortion regulations
on abortion timing, the data must be either multi-state, with
which a comparison study of regulatory and non-regulatory states
can be conducted, or time-series, with which an analysis of a
state that has changed its abortion policies can be done.

CHAPTER 2
LITERATURE REVIEW

The hypothesis that economic variables affect when a
woman terminates her pregnancy does not readily follow from
consumer demand analysis and,
established economic model.

thus,

is not derived from an

However,

by applying previous

economic and sociological studies on abortion,

a

theoretical framework with which to study abortion timing
can be developed.
This chapter first presents data on abortion trends in
the United States,

trends whose causes both economic and

sociological researchers have been working to identify.
Secondly,

previous abortion demand studies will be

described in order to provide the theoretical context with
which to study abortion timing.

Next,

this chapter

describes a sociological study that includes an analysis of
the impact of restrictive laws on abortion timing.

With

these descriptions of previous abortion research in mind,
the remaining portion of this chapter will develop how to

logically model the economic determinants of abortion
timing.

Abortion Trends
An important reason analysts study abortion,
economic and sociological terms,

is that while abortion

legislation has become more cumbersome,

the number of

reported abortions has noticeably decreased.
Henshaw

(1998),

abortion rates

aged 15-44 per year)

in both

According to

(abortions per 1,000 women

gradually climbed from 16.3 in 1973 to

29.3 in 1981 and then steadily declined to almost 23 by
1996.

Changes in abortion ratios

(abortions per 100

pregnancies per year ending in abortion or live birth) were
similar,

ranging from 19.3 in 1973, up to approximately 30

in the early 198 0 ^s, and back down to 26.1 in 1996.

See

Table 2.1.
This pattern in abortion trends,
Roe

V.

from increasing once

Wade was decided to eventually decreasing has led

economists to study what determines the decision to have an
abortion.

Have federal and state regulations affected the

number of abortions?

Do these trends reflect a woman's

increasing participation in the work force?

Economists

interested in these questions have conducted abortion
demand analyses, which essentially estimate the impact of

various economic and sociological factors on abortion
rates.

TABLE 2.1.
NUMBER OF REPORTED ABORTIONS (in Thousands), ABORTION
R A T E * , AND ABORTION R A TIO **, UNITED STATES, 1973-96 12
Year
Abortions
Rate
Ratio

1973
1974
1975
1976
1977
1978
1979
1980
1981
1982
1983
1984
1985
1986
1987
1988
1989
1990
1991
1992
1993
1994
1995
1996

744 .6
898.6
1,034.2
1,179.3
1,316.7
1,409 .6
1,497 .7
1, 553 .9
1, 577 .3
1,573.9
1,575 .0
1,577.2
1, 588 .6
1,574.0
1,559.1
1,590.8
1, 566 .9
1 ,608 .6
1,556.5
1,528.9
1,500.0
1,431.0
1,363 .7
1,365.7

16.3
19.3
21.7
24.2
26.4
27.7
28.8
29 .3
29 .3
28 .8
28 .5
28.1
28.0
27 .4
26.9
27.3
26.8
27 .4
26.3
25.9
25.4
24 .1
22 .9
22 .9

19.3
22 .0
24 .9
26.5
28.6
29.2
29 .6
30.0
30.1
30.0
30.4
29.7
29.7
29.4
28.8
28. 6
27.5
28. 0
27.4
27 .5
27.4
26.7
26 .0
26.1

indicate a]bortions per 1000 women aged 15-44 and
abortions per 100 pregnancies ending in abortion or livebirth, respectively.

This data was taken from Henshaw

(1995-96).
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Abortion Demand
When economists began examining the effects of both
abortion policy and other economic costs on abortion rates,
economic fertility analysis was already well established.
Robinson

(1997)

states that the economic theory of

fertility had been developed and applied to the growing
volumes of population and contraceptive use survey data
that previously served only as the source of descriptive
statistics.

In other words,

demography and other studies

that focused on fertility were w e 11-developed empirical
disciplines but lacked any theoretical framework.
Economics provided this framework by treating fertility as
a result of rational decision making,

incorporating

fertility decisions into consumer demand theory.
According to Robinson,

Harvey Leibenstein,

in 1957,

first articulated the economic theory of fertility by
applying cost-benefit analysis,

focusing on the decision

making process of fertility at the margin.

There,

a couple

rationally chooses whether or not to have another child by
weighing the expected utilities and dis tutilities.
Later,

Gary Becker brought Lei ben ste in's work into the

household production function framework,

where the

household itself produces its own utility with internal
resources,

known as "household technology" and external,

or

11

purchased,

resources.

Children,

then,

are the product of

this "household technology," a special type of "capital
good" who require initial and periodic maintenance
expenditures.

Children produce chiId-services over time,

who provide utility for parents.

As with Leibenstein,

parents weigh the utility of the child's "production"
against its disutility,

or costs, when making their

reproductive decision.

If costs exceed benefits,

control is used.

fertility

One such method of fertility control is

abortion.
The typical demand model of abortion services
incorporates price,

income,

demographic factors which

represent consumer preferences,
constraints.

and public policy

Coelen and McIntyre conducted one of the

first such studies in 1973 by analyzing abortion policy
effects on Hungary's abortion rates.
V.

Wade,

Three years after Roe

Deyak and Smith did a similar analysis in the

United States.
This chapter describes in detail two abortion demand
studies,

conducted by Medoff

(1988)

and Garbacz

(1990).

These analyses are the best examples available of abortion

Other fertility control options include contraception and
adoption.
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demand studies using fairly current data and reflecting the
experience of the United States
Using regression analysis,

after Roe v. Wade in1973.
Medoff estimates an

equation of the form:

Ai

=

So +

S iP i

+

S2Y i

+ SoSNG Li

+

S ^ L F P i + S5 C A T H i

+ SgWi

+ S7M1

+ Ui

The dependent variable is the number of abortions per
1,000 pregnancies for each state in 1980.
P is the price of abortions.

Its coefficient Si can be

used to assess the impact that prohibiting abortion would
have on the abortion demand.

Medoff argues that because

abortion is not fundamentally different from other goods
and services,

the law of demand will apply to abortion;

making it illegal would dramatically raise the service's
price and decrease the abortion rate.

In the estimation,

P

is measured by the average price of an abortion in
nonhospital facilities performed in the first trimester in
each state.
Income

(Y), which reflects the budget constraint,

is

the average income in each state of women fifteen to fortyfour years old.
A woman's marital status
abortion decision because,

(SNGL)

is relevant to the

for a single woman,

the costs of

13
an additional child are much higher than for a married
woman.

Married women, presumably,

have the advantage of

shared household responsibilities with their spouse,
lessening the costs of caring for an additional child.
SNGL is the percentage of women aged fifteen to forty-four
in each state who are unmarried and is argued to have a
positive effect on the abortion rate.
The female labor force participation rate

(LFP) shows

the likelihood that a woman would be earning wages she
would have to give up if she had a child.

Women who are

working are expected to have a higher demand for abortions.
LFP is the labor force participation rate for each state
for women 15-44.

S4, the coefficient on LFP,

is predicted

to be positive.
Medoff argues that demographic factors influence
consumer preferences.

One such factor is religion.

The

Roman Catholic Church unambiguously disapproves of
abortions.

Being Catholic increases the psychological cost

to a woman of obtaining an abortion and,

therefore.

This particular opportunity cost seems to be a contentious
issue within feminist economics.
Considering that many women
simultaneously work and raise children, it seems outdated to
interpret a woman's wages as something they would give up to have
children.
On the other hand, women are both participating
relatively more in the labor force and having relatively fewer
children, a seemingly negative correlation.

14
decreases demand.

The CATH variable is the percentage of

Catholic population in each s t a t e .
Another difference that is relevant to the abortion
decision is liberal convictions.

Medoff states that most

fertility studies assume constant tastes across
populations.
West

H o w e v e r , he asserts that states in the Far

(California,

Hawaii)

Oregon,

Washington, Nevada, Arizona and

are more liberal than other states in terms of

social stability and social n o r m s .

Thus, W is a dummy

variable that equals 1 for states of the far West and is
expected to have a positive effect on the abortion rate.
M is a dummy variable that equals one for states that
provided Medicaid funding for poor women who sought
abortions in 1988,

the study year.

Its impact is predicted

to be positive given that women who receive state funding
do not face the same costs as women who live in states that
do not provide Medicaid insurance for abortions.

U is the

error term.
Medoff examines two policies in his abortion demand
analysis,

the overall constitutional prohibition of

abortion and the cessation of Medicaid funded abortions.

On the contrary, Arizona is arguably a politically conservative
state.
In 1996, the Hyde Amendment barred federal funding of abortions
using Medicaid funds.
In 1997, a revised Hyde Amendment allowed
states to deny the use of Medicaid funds for abortions.
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Medoff found that other things equal,
women would have,

on average,

in Medicaid states,

forty-four more abortions per

thousand pregnancies than in states that do not provide
public funding.

In other words,

states that eliminated

Medicaid funding would have seen a 17.5% decrease in their
1980 abortion rates.

Also, he found a significant negative

relationship between price and abortion.
inelastic at

-.81.^^

Demand was

Medoff argues that if,

for example,

the illegal price of abortion was 50% higher than the
prevailing market price, making abortion illegal would
decrease the abortion rate 40.5%, holding all else
co n s t a n t .
Other results from the study were that the percent
single and percent in the labor force were both found
significantly positive; women in western states have
eighteen more abortions per thousand pregnancies,
parebus;

ceteris

income was significantly positive with an

elasticity of

.71; and a state's Catholic population had

little effect on the demand for abortions.

Elasticities for this study were calculated at the mean.
Estimating that the price of abortion would increase by 50%
seems to underestimate the total increase in costs that women
would face if abortion was not legal.
Not only would the price
of an illegal abortion be higher, women would face the risk of
going to jail, increased medical r i s k s , and the emotional stress
of not having abortion readily available.
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Garbacz's abortion demand study is useful because he
attempts to determine if teenagers behave differently than
adult women in the abortion decision.

He does this by

running regressions for the total reproductive age group as
well for separate age groups 15-17,

15-19,

and 20-44.

His

equation for the total reproductive age group is of the
form:

TO TAL

Ê o P R IC E i

+

i^ iIN C O M E i

+

E g M E D IC A ID i

+ E sU R B A N i

+

S 4 B LA C K i + iS sG A LLU P i + SeED + E v S IT E i + U i

The dependent variable is the abortion rate per
thousand pregnancies for each state
the overall 15-44 age group,
states.

(TOTAL)

in 1982.

For

data was available from all

For the individual age groups,

data was available

from 37 states.
Garbacz"s price variable

(PRICE)

is the average price

in each state of an abortion using a local anesthetic,
nonhospital facilities,
Garbacz expects,

in

and performed the first ten weeks.

like Medoff,

that the abortion rate and

price will have a negative relationship.

However,

he

recognizes that the price variation between states is not
very large^^.^°

19

Income

(INCOME)

is the disposable personal

The standard deviation is 10.9% of the mean.

2° Medoff did not address this price variation.

17
income per capita in each state for 1982.

This measure is

different from Medoff's, which was women's,
capita,

rather than per

income.

Unlike Medoff,

Garbacz includes a variable for travel

cost, which addresses the relevant problem that many women
do not have adequate access to abortion services.

Women

who travel long distances have relatively higher costs
associated with having an abortion than women who live
close to an abortion provider.

G a r b a c z 's variable SITE

represents the travel cost for women residing in rural
areas.

It is the number of abortion sites per million

population of reproductive age that are located in rural
areas of each state.
URBAN is the percentage of the population in each
state that resides in an urban area.

Garbacz argues the

importance of including an urban variable

(URBAN)

model to measure access to abortion services.

in the

Yet, urban

areas may also capture Medicaid effects because most states
that are relatively more urban are more likely to provide
Medicaid coverage.

He attempts to identify these effects

separately by comparing regressions in which both MEDICAID

Garbacz notes this difference but does not explain it.
Urban areas may also capture the effects of Garbacz's SITE
variable.
Presumably, women who live in urban areas have better
access to abortion providers than women in rural areas, which is
what Garbacz intended for SITE to measure.
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and URBAN and only MEDICAID, without URBAN,

are included.

MEDICAID is a dummy variable for states that provide
funding for abortions.

The coefficients on both URBAN and

MEDICAID are hypothesized to be positive.
Instead of the female labor force participation rate,
Garbacz uses education
cost of having a child.

(ED) to represent the opportunity
ED is the percentage of the

population twenty-five years or older that had earned a
high school degree or GED.
G a r b a c z 's specification of demographic variables
reflecting preferences is slightly different than Medoff's,
Instead of a Far West variable for liberal taste, he
includes an attitudinal measure from the GALLUP Poll
(GALLUP), which is the percentage of the population from
four census regions that support Roe v. Wade.
Because black women have a greater abortion rate than
white women,

Garbacz includes the variable BLACK,

the

percentage of women of child-bearing age who are black in
each state.

He expects the effect to be positive for

adults and negative for teenagers.

U is the random

variable.

However, white teenagers have 1.45 the abortion rate of black
teenagers.
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For the overall age group, Garbacz"s price and income
coefficients were found to be statistically significant
wit h elasticities of

-.68 and ,84, quite similar to

Medoff 's.^^
In the model that includes all ages, both URBAN and
SITE were found positive and statistically significant.
opposed to Medoff's analysis,
statistically significant.

As

MEDICAID was not found to be

Yet, when URBAN is dropped from

the model,

MEDICAID has almost the same elasticity as in

Medoff's.

This suggests that the true effect MEDICAID has

on the abortion rate is unknown,

leaving the issue of

M e d o f f 's significant MEDICAID variable unresolved.
For the model that includes all ages and both URBAN
and MEDICAID,
significant.

BLACK,

GALLUP,

and ED are not found to be

Garbacz finds that BLACK is both negative and

significant for teenagers.

Neither URBAN nor GALLUP have a

significant effect on teenage abortion rates.

Abortion Timing
Both Medoff's and G a r b a c z 's abortion demand models are
examples of how abortion trends are being studied by
economists.

24

No comparable economic research has been

Garbacz's elasticities are also calculated at the mean.
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conducted on the timing of abortion.
however,

Sociologists,

have addressed this pertinent issue.

While examining the effects of state mandatory delay
laws on abortion trends, Althaus and Henshaw

(1994)

studied

both abortion rates for women in Mississippi and
gestational ages at the time of abortion.

Mississippi's

mandatory delay law went into effect in August 1992.
requires that a woman receive,

in person,

information on

abortion 24 hours before her scheduled procedure.
includes the name of the abortion provider;
risks associated with abortion;
age of the fetus;
pregnancy to term;

It

This

the medical

the estimated gestational

the medical risks of carrying the
and the financial options made available

to women who decide against abortion.

Because the law

mandates that women must receive this information in
person,

it requires two visits to the provider clinic.

Althaus and Henshaw acquired their data from the
Mississippi State Department of Health,
Health Statistics.

Division of Public

The data are tabulations of the number

of Mississippi residents and nonresidents who received
abortions each month in 1992.
Mississippi,

age,

race,

For residents of

education level,

county of

residence and gestation of the pregnancy were recorded.
determine whether women went to neighboring states for

To
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abortions,

the same data was collected for Mississippi

residents from the adjacent states of Alabama and
Tennessee.
After controlling for monthly fluctuations in abortion
rates,

abortions performed dropped 22% in the six months

following the imposed mandatory delay law.

Simultaneously,

the number of residents of other states who had abortions
in Mississippi decreased by 30% and 17% more Mississippi
residents had abortions in Alabama and Tennessee than
before the state law.
The gestational ages at which pregnancies were
terminated changed significantly.
residents having abortions,

Among Mississippi

the percentage having the

procedure at less than 9 weeks fell by 25%.

Abortions

performed at greater than 12 weeks increased by 17% in the
two periods.
Althaus and Henshaw also examined which women may have
been more affected by the 24-hour delay law.
without a high school degree,

For those

there was a 2 8% decrease in

abortion as compared to a 10% decline for high school
graduates.
significant.

Neither age nor race was statistically
Also,

the abortion rates among women who

lived within a county with an abortion provider, within 50
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miles of a provider,

and lived farther than 50 miles from a

provider did not vary after the mandatory delay law was
imposed.

Economic Theory and Abortion Timing
Developing the argument that economic variables
determine when a woman decides to have her abortion
requires using the abortion demand model applied in the
previously described research.

The abortion demand model

hypothesizes that a woman chooses to have an abortion or
keep her pregnancy by using the utility maximizing costbenefit analysis.

If the net costs of having the child are

higher than the net costs of aborting it, the abortion
demand model states that a woman will terminate her
pregnancy.
There are,

arguably,

two components to a woman's

fertility decision process,

learning about the relevant

cost information and weighing it.

A woman learns what the

costs and benefits of having an abortion are and having a
child and then she weighs those costs in order to make her
decision.

No information was reported for between weeks between 9 and 12.
Costs associated with abortion include the price of the
abortion, the travel cost, the physical discomfort of the
procedure, and the psychic or spiritual cost of terminating a
pregnancy.
The costs of keeping the child include the financial
costs of raising the child; the opportunity cost of lost wages;
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Inherent to this two-step process is that it requires
a certain amount of time.

Given that women evidently abort

their pregnancies at different times,

it seems women take

different amounts time to make their decisions.
the abortion decision process has two components,

Because
this

varied time could be attributed to either the time it takes
to learn about their fertility options,
to weigh them,

the time it takes

or both.

In terms of gathering the fertility option
information,

a woman who is well educated and has

accomplished goals that require initiative, would arguably
take a relatively short amount of time collecting
information about her fertility decision.

Alternatively,

a

young girl who does not have the personal experience
necessary to collect information on the net costs of
fertility options would take a relatively longer time
obtaining such information.^^
In the economic model of fertility,

the relative

economic costs determine if a woman aborts or keeps her

the opportunity cost of future opportunities related to
education, employment, or recreation; and the physical cost of
the p r e g n a n c y .
The Alan Guttmacher Institute states that 20% of all abortions
are performed on teenagers.
Of second trimester abortions, that
percentage increases to 33%.
This information was obtained from
the Alan Guttmacher Institute website w w w .a g i u s a .org/pubs/fbi nduced_abortion.h t m l .
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pregnancy.The

costs and benefits associated with making

the abortion decision may also well determine when the
decision is made.

From the fertility model,

a woman who

terminates her pregnancy considers the costs of having the
child to be higher than the costs of the abortion.

How

long it takes her to make the decision to abort could be
determined by the relative difference between her net
costs.

More specifically,

if a woman has low costs

associated with abortion relative to the costs of having
the child,

it is a clearer, more obvious decision for her

to make and,
example,

thus,

she will make it earlier.

Consider,

for

a woman who lives close to an abortion provider

and has no moral dilemma associated with abortion.
Simultaneously,

she has a high paying job, and therefore,

high opportunity cost of having a child.
choices,

a

Given these

she will presumably have greater ease in making

her decision to have an abortion and will make it earlier.
Alternatively,

if a woman's costs of having an

abortion are relatively close to the opportunity costs of
her having the child,

she will have a harder time making

Another fertility option is adoption.
Throughout the
literature, however, adoption was intentionally ignored because
it is chosen so rarely.
Despite this omission, it is still a
relevant option and warrants mentioning.
In terms of the
economic model of fertility, then, adoption is presumably rarely
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the decision.
example,

This difficulty requires a longer time.

For

if a woman is conservative and finds terminating

her pregnancy morally troublesome, which is a high
psychological cost associated with abortion,
married,
child,

and she is

which Medoff argues lessens the cost of having a

she has a more complicated choice to make.

her options are more ambiguous,

Because

she will take a longer time

to make her decision.
Chapter Conclusion
The hypothesis that economic factors affect when a
woman aborts her pregnancy is somewhat intuitive rather
than formal.

However,

previous research in both sociology

and economics provide the em.pirical and theoretical
contexts within which to think about this hypothesis.
Sociologists have illustrated how abortion trends have
changed,

indicating that the timing of abortions requires

analyses in an economic framework.

Abortion demand studies

are useful to this study by both demonstrating that the
decision to have an abortion can be placed in a costbenefit decision making framework and by determining which
costs and benefits are weighed in the decision.
theoretical

framework,

In this

a woman has her abortion only after

chosen because the psychic cost of carrying a child and then
giving that child up is very high.
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enough time has elapsed for her to weigh the costs and
benefits of her abortion decision.

Both learning about the

costs associated with the abortion decision and the degree
of separation between these costs are what determine how
long it takes a woman to decide whether or not to have an
abortion.
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CHAPTER 3
DATA AND EMPIRICAL SPECIFICATION

This chapter describes the data used to study the
determinants of gestational ages at the time of abortion.
It then builds an econometric model of the abortion timing
decision based on client economic and sociological
characteristics.

Each of the independent variables is

described and a hypothesis presented regarding their
individual effects on abortion timing.

The model seeks to

explain the factors that delay abortion beyond 12 weeks
from the last menstrual period.
explanation,

Following the model

descriptive statistics on the model's

independent variables are provided.

Data
The data used in this study is from Blue Mountain
Clinic

(BMC), a family practice clinic in Missoula,

Montana

that provides abortion services.

Planned Parenthood of Montana, as well as various private
physicians, also provide abortions in Missoula.
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The data was collected in two ways.

First,

BMC clinic

administered a survey to all of its abortion clients from
the first abortion service day in October 1998 to the last
abortion service day in September 1999.^°

Three hundred and

forty one clients were asked to complete the survey.

Each

patient was asked to provide information on her income
level; number of people supported by household income;
ethnicity;

education level;

employment status;

student

status ; medical insurance coverage status; means of payment
(including insurance, when available);

and reasons for

choosing Blue Mountain Clinic as her provider.
The second set of data was from the chart information
of the surveyed clients.

For each client,

these included

the gestational age of the pregnancy at the time of
abortion;

the number of days between the date of her

positive pregnancy test and when she called the clinic to
seek an abortion; number of previous pregnancies,

including

the number of previous live births, miscarriages,

and

abortions;

city of residence;

and her age.

Blue Mountain Clinic typically provides abortions three times
per month.
The number of patients provided abortions on these
days ranges from as few as 5 to as many as 20.
Each client filled out at least some portion of the survey.
However, not every client completed the survey.
A copy of the survey is provided in Appendix D.
This information has been treated confidentially.
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Not all of the variables obtained were used in this
analysis.

However,

descriptives for all of the variables

were calculated at the request of Blue Mountain Clinic and
are reported in Appendix E.

General Model and Hypothesis
This thesis seeks to estimate the probability that a
woman defers her abortion past the 12^^ week L M P .

A model

predicting this probability is given by:

Pg

=

f[TRAVEL,

TEEN, PREVAB,

INCOME, COLLEGE1, WHITE, LFP,

MARRIED]

(3.1)

Pg is the probability that a woman will defer her
abortion past the 12^^ week LMP.

The reason for choosing

this gestational age is that the 13^^ week is nearing the
second trimester and is when medical risks associated with
the abortion service increase.

TRAVEL is the miles that a woman traveled to obtain an
abortion.

TRAVEL represents the travel cost associated

with having an abortion;
obtain an abortion,

the farther a woman must travel to

the higher the abortion cost.

higher the costs associated with abortion,
preferable it is to have the procedure.

The

the less clearly

It is hypothesized
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that a higher travel cost will increase the probability
that a woman will have an abortion after the 12^^ week.
Montana does not currently have any active abortion
restrictions.

However,

TRAVEL can be used to assess the

effects of a mandatory delay law, which imposes a time cost
on women seeking abortions.

Like a delay law, travel

imposes costs in the form of time loss and,

in some cases,

out of pocket expenses for overnight stays away from home.
As mentioned in the previous chapter,
SITE,

Garbacz used

or the number of abortion sites per million

population of reproductive age that are located in rural
areas of each state,

to capture the travel cost effect.

TRAVEL is a more precise me a s u r e m e n t .

It was calculated by

measuring the distance in miles between a client ^s city of
residence and Missoula,
Clinic.If

the locale of Blue Mountain

a client's city of residence was Missoula,

it

was assumed that their miles traveled was 5.

TEEN is a dummy variable measuring whether a woman is
younger than eighteen years old.
adult women eighteen or older.

The control group is
As discussed in Chapter 2,

teenagers might take a longer time in gathering and

This was estimated in November 1999 by an Infoseek website that
calculated distances.
The web address is www.mapquest.com/
infoseek/mqtripplus.
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assessing their information on the costs of both abortion
and maintaining the pregnancy.

Thus,

they are hypothesized

to terminate their pregnancies later rather than earlier.
TEEN is hypothesized to have a positive coefficient.

PREVAB is a dummy variable measuring whether or not a woman
has had a previous abortion.

Its inclusion follows the

line of reasoning that the amount of time it takes to
gather the necessary information relevant in making the
abortion decision determines the timing of the decision.
If a woman has had an abortion,
time to gather information;

she has already taken the

the timing of the decision only

depends on the time it takes to weigh the relative costs
and benefits.

PREVAB is hypothesized to be negatively

associated to the probability that a woman has her abortion
at 13 weeks or l a t e r .

INCOME1 is the level of a client's household income.
Medoff and Garbacz contend that abortion is a normal good,
indicating that when income increases,
increases.

demand for abortion

This implies that the higher a woman's income,

the higher is the opportunity cost associated with having a
child.

In this study,

it is hypothesized that the greater

the relative difference between the costs of the abortion
and the cost of childrearing,

the faster the choice to
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abort or not is made.

Thus,

the higher the income level,

the lower the probability that a woman will defer her
abortion past the 12^^ week.

Income is argued to be

negatively related to Pg.
In the survey,
categories.

INCOME is recorded in one of eight

Inclusion in a category is represented by

dummy variables, with household income under $5,000 being
the base case.

Thus,

there are 7 dummy INCOME variables,

each labeled by number.

For example INCOME2 is the dummy

variable for the 2^^ lowest income category,
$15,000."

INCOMES is the income category,

"$5,001over "$65,000."

COLLEGE1 is a dummy variable indicating whether a woman has
gone to one year of college.

I f is assumed that the timing

of the abortion decision is informed by how long it takes a
woman to gather the information that is weighed in the
fertility decision.

If a woman is educated,

she may

already have that information or she may be more efficient,
from experience,

in getting the information.

It is hypothesized that having completed a year of
college indicates a level of experience not necessarily

The income categories are: $5,000, $5,001-$15,000, $15,001$2 5,000, $2 5,0 01-$35,0 00, $3 5,001-$45,000, $45,0 01-$5 5,00 0,
$55,0 01 - $ 6 5 ,001, and over $65,000.
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obtained with a high school diploma.

Women who have gone

to college have taken the initiative to apply for college
and complete two semesters.

This demonstrates a level of

maturity required to gather the fertility decision
information.

Thus,

COLLEGEl is hypothesized to be

negatively related to Pg.

WHITE is a dummy variable measuring whether a woman is
Caucasian.
American,

The base case represents women who are Native
African-American,

Spanish,

or Asian.

This ethnic variable is included in this study to be
congruent with both Garbacz's study, which included a dummy
variable for the percentage of women of child-bearing age
who are black in each state,

and other sociological studies

that measure abortion trends by racial g r o u p s .

Garbacz

stated that black women have a higher abortion rate than
white women.

Presumably,

any factor that raises the

abortion rate for a group tends to reduce the probability
of delay.

Thus, WHITE is hypothesized to be positively

related to the probability that a woman defers past the 12^^
week LMP.

Garbacz measured education as the percentage of the population
twenty-five years or older that had earned a high school degree
or GED.
One example of such a study is "Sociodemographic Determinants
of Abortion in the United States" by Powell-Griner and Trent

(1987) .
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IjFP is a dummy variable

measuring whether a woman is

employed.

Medoff,

According to

a woman who is working

earning wages she would

have to give up if

and is expected to have

a higher demand for abortions.

is

she had a child

That logic applied to this study would mean that a woman who
was

employed would make her abortion decision faster than

women who do not work. However, women who work also
higher costs associated with abortion.

have

LFP could represent

the

opportunity cost of arranging to miss and losing a work

day

to have an abortion,

which would arguably have a

positive effect on the probability of deferring an
abortion.

Thus,

the effect LFP has on the probability that

a woman has her abortion past the 12^^ week LMP is unknown.^®

MARRIED is a dummy variable representing women who are
married.

The base case represents women who are single,

divorced,

or separated.

Medoff included a variable for

single women arguing that single women have higher costs
associated with having the child than married women.
Alternatively,

married women have lower costs associated

with having the child.

Married women,

based on their set

Because the expected sign the coefficient is unknown,
sided t-test is necessary.

a two-
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of costs,

are expected to be more ambivalent about abortion

than single women and,

therefore, more likely to delay.

Variable Description
Table 3.1 presents descriptive statistics for AGE, AB,
and LMP,

and TRAVEL.

AGE is the client's age.

AB is the

number of previous abortions each client has previously
had.

LMP is the gestational age

(by last menstrual period)

of each client's terminated pregnancy.

TRAVEL is miles

each client traveled to Blue Mountain Clinic.

TABLE 3.1

LMP
TRAVEL
AGE
AB

N
285
294
295
285

DESCRIPTIV]2S
Maximum
Mean
14.5
8 .067
711. 7
90 .729
46
25 .13
.47
5

Minimum
3 .5
5.0
15
0

Std. Deviation
2 .565
94.651
6.71
.82

Table 3.2 presents frequencies for the model's dummy
variables.

LMP13,

TEEN,

formed from LMP, AGE,
participation,

and PREVAB are the dummy variables

and A B .

LFP,

or labor force

is a dummy variable for women who work.

COLLEGE is a dummy variable for women who have gone to at
least one year of college.

WHITE is a dummy variable

representing a Caucasian woman,
American, African-American,

rather than a Native

Hispanic,

or Asian woman.
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Finally,

INCOME1 through INCOMES represent the different

levels of household income.

INCOMEl is the base case.

TABLE 3.2

VARIABLE
LMP 13
TEEN
PREVAB
MARRIED
WHITE
COLLEGEl
INCOMEl
INCOME2
INCOME3
INCOME4
INCOME5
INCOME6
INCOME7
INCOMES

FREQUENCIES FOR DUMMY
N^^
0 Values
1
285
263
295
270
285
190
324
272
317
30
327
130
58
300
300
96
58
300
300
34
300
16
300
13
8
300
7
300

VARIABL]3S
Values
22
25
95
52
287
197
242
204
242
266
284
287
292
293

1 Values/N
7.7
8 .5
33.3
16 .05
90.5
60.2
19.3
32 .0
19.3
11.3
5 .3
4.3
2 .7
5.7

As illustrated in Table 3.2, over 50% of the clients
indicated their household income was less than $15,000.
Pie Chart 3.1 illustrates the distribution of
household income for clients under 23 years old.

Pie Chart

3.2 illustrates the distribution of household income for
clients 23 and older.

When comparing these graphs,

it is

noticeable that almost 7 0% of the clients under age 23
indicated their income was $15,000 or less and

39
number of observations differs for each variable because
some clients did not complete the survey.
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approximately 37% of women 2 3 and older reported income
$15,000 or l e s s .
It is not realistic that most of the younger women
live in households with low income and women over 22 live
in relatively high-income households.
the younger women,
income,

Presumably, many of

rather than indicating their household

reported their personal income.

If this is so,

INCOME is mismeasured.
Despite this potential sampling problem,

INCOME is

retained in the model because of its theoretical
importance.

The problem can be lessened by reducing INCOME

from 8 categories to 2.^°

40 INCOMEl and INCÜME2 represent the 1 v a l u e s .
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PIE CHART 3.1
HOUSEHOLD INCOME OF 2 2 AND YOUNGER

over $65,000
5.4%
$55,001-$65,000

$45,001-55,000

$35,001-$45,000

$25,001-35,000

$15,001-$25,000

$5,001-$15,000

Under $5,000
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PIE CHART 3.2
HOUSEHOLD INCOME OF 2 3 AND OLDER

over $65,000
6.7%
$55,001-$65,000
.7%
$45,001-55,000
5.4%

Under $5,000
10.7%

$35,001-$45,000
8.7%
$5,001 $15,000
$25,001-35,000
14.8%

$15,001-$25,000
26.8%

26.2%
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CHAPTER 4
EMPIRICAL RESULTS

The first section of this chapter derives the logit
equation used to estimate the abortion timing model and
then presents the model results.

The second section

interprets the model results and discusses these
estimations in terms of their economic significance.

Logit Estimation Method
Given that the dependent variable Pg measures the
probability of whether or not a woman terminates her
pregnancy after 12 weeks LMP,
tool is logit,

the appropriate measurement

in which the dependent variable is

continuous but bounded between 0 and 1.
Deriving the logit model begins with the cumulative
logistic distribution function 4.1.^^

Pi = E(Y =

llXi)=

1 / (1 + e'tBl +

)

(4.1)

SHAZAM was used to estimate the Logit model.
Discussion and derivation of the logit model was acquired from
Gujarati (1995).
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To simplify the expression,

it can be written as equation

4.2.

Pi = 1 / (1 +

(4.2)

where the index Zi = Bi + B2Xi.+ U

Pi ranges from 0 to 1 as Zi ranges from negative
infinity to positive infinity.

Pi is nonlinearly related to

Zi in terms of both the independent variables and the betas
However,

this is easily resolved by transforming equation

(4.2) .

If Pi is the probability of abortion after 12 weeks

LMP,

then

(1 - Pi) is the probability of abortion at 12

weeks or earlier.

1 - P i =

Equation

(4.4)

=

l/

(1 +

(4.3)

is the odds ratio in favor of

terminating pregnancy after 12 weeks.

In other words,

it

is the ratio of the probability of deferring abortion after
12 weeks to the probability of having it at 12 weeks or
earlier.

Pi

/ (1 -

Pi

) = (1 + e^M/(l +

(4.4)
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When the log of the odds ratio is taken, L
both linear in X and the parameters.

(4.5)

is

L is called the

logit.

Li = In

(Pi / (1 - Pi ) ) = Zi

(4.5)

As Pi ranges from 0 to 1, the logit model goes from
negative infinity to positive infinity.
regression equations,

In linear

the estimated slope-coefficient

represents the average effect on the dependent variable for
a one unit change in the explanatory variables.
Interpreting the coefficients of the logit model is not so
straightforward.

Li = In

(Pi / (1 - Pi )) = Bi + BkXi.+ Ui

In equation

(4.6),

unit change in X.

(4.6)

represents the change in L for a

In other words,

it illustrates how the

log-odds in favor of deferring an abortion changes as the
explanatory variables change.

The intercept Bi is the value

of the log-odds ratio in favor of abortion occurring after
12 weeks when the independent variables are all zero.
In terms of probability for continuous variables,
these marginal effects can be derived with calculus.

Pi =

1

/ { 1 + e '^ ")

=

(4.7)

43

=

/ (1 +

(4.8)

* (1 +

In equation

(4.9),

(4.9)

taking the partial derivative of X

with respect to the probability Pi gives:

dPi/dXk = (e^' * (1 +

=

Bk * e ^ W

- Bk *

dXk = (4.10)

(1 + e^^)^

P(1 - P)

=

(4.11)

(4.12)

As shown in equation 4.12, measuring the rate

of

change in probability with respect to X involves both Bk and
the level of probability from which the change is measured.
The given probabilities are typically evaluated at the
means.
Interpreting changes in probability for binomial dummy
variables requires first picking baseline values and
computing the log of the odds-ratio for these values.
Then,

exponentiating the log of the odds-ratio isolates the

odds-ratio.
(0,1)

Solve for the probability at the two values

of the relevant dummy variable.

Calculating the
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difference gives the probability change resulting from the
specific event, holding other variables constant.

Logit Results
Table 4.8 presents the results for the logit model.

TABLE 4.1
LOGIT RESULTS
B
S.E.
P-Value
Asymptotic TRatio
INCOME
.35811
.65498
.701
.54675
COLLEGEl
-1.6574*
.72722
.Oil
-2 .2791
TEEN
1.3614*
.042
.78939
1.7246
.682
MARRIED
-.55104
1.1762
-.46850
-1.6310
.051
PREVAB
-1.7624**
1.0805
.517
-.042945
WHITE
-.0514
1.1968
-.33838
.638
.003767
TRAVEL
-.001275
.60037
.548
.71156
.42720
LFP^'^
.066
-1.5052
1.4485
-2.1803
Constant
*, ** indicate significance at the 5% and 10% levels,
resp ec tive ly .

Three of the estimated coefficients are significant
and four are not.

COLLEGEl,

a dummy variable for women who

have completed one year of college,
5% level.

TEEN,

18 years old,

is significant at the

a dummy variable for women who are under

is also significant at the 5% level.

PREVAB,

a dummy variable indicating if a woman has had a previous
abortion,

and the constant are significant at the 10%

level.

Explanation by Roncek (1991).
44 The p-Value for LFP is two-sided.
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The remaining five variables,
TRAVEL,

INCOME, MARRIED, WHITE,

and LFP are insignificant.

coefficients,

All of the estimated

except for TRAVEL and MARRIED, have the

expected signs.

In the previous chapter, both TRAVEL and

MARRIED were hypothesized to have a positive effect on the
probability that a woman defers her abortion to the 13
week.

Their coefficients are actually negative.
In terms of goodness of fit,

the conventional R^

measures are not appropriate when the dependent variable y
takes on values 0 or 1.

Maddala provides several R^-type

measures for such qualitative dependent variables,
including both McFadden's R^ and the percentage of correct
pr e d i c t i o n s .
McFadden"s R^ is given by the expression

1 — (log LuR/log L r )

For this model,

the McFadden goodness of fit measure is

.208 ^^

Table 4.2 shows the number of both y=l values and y-0
values correctly and incorrectly predicted.

An observation

is correctly predicted as y-1 if the estimated prob(y=l)

See Maddala (1992).
Both Craig and Uhler and McFadden's
SHAZAM.

are calculated in

is
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greater than 0.07.

The percentage correctly predicted is

called the count-R^ which is 79.0 for this model"^^

TABLE 4.2
CLASSIFICATION TABLE
Predicted
Predicted
Before 12
After 12
Weeks
Weeks
175
44

Observed
Before 12
Weeks
Observed
5
After 12
Weeks
Overall
Percentage
The threshold level is 0.07.

Percentage
Correct

10

79 .9

66.7

19. 0

Policy Implications of Model Results
This section presents the estimated probabilities and
their relative changes that occur when a determinant
variable changes.

With these probabilities,

this section

then discusses the policy implications of the independent
variables.

Marginal Effects and Probability Changes
All of the variables,
variables.

except for TRAVEL,

are dummy

As described in the previous chapter,

the

probability resulting from a change in dummy variables from
0 to 1 can be calculated by estimating the difference
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For a detailed explanation of classification tables,

see
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between the mean probabilities when the dummy is 1 and when
the dummy is 0.

For TRAVEL,

the marginal effect can be

estimated by taking the derivative of the independent
variable with respect to P.

Table 4.3 presents these

estimated effects on the probability that a woman will
defer her abortion to the 13^^ week.'^®

TABLE 4.3

VARIABLES

PROBABILITIES
Changes in Probabilities

INCOME

0 .01821

COLLEGEl

-0.08675

TEEN

0.10110

MARRIED

-0.02487

PREVAB

-0.06508

LFP

0 .02205

WHITE

-0.02708

TRAVEL

-0 .00009

In Chapter 2, it was hypothesized that the time it
takes a woman to decide on abortion is a function of both

Kennedy (1992) .
These figures are calculated using the mean values of all the
independent variables except for the variable for which the
probability change is being calculated.
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the ability of the woman to gather the relevant cost
information and how high the abortion costs that she faces
are relative to the cost of having a child.

These results

suggest that what affects abortion timing is not the set of
costs a woman faces, but how long it takes her to learn
about the costs.
TRAVEL,

INCOME,

LFP,

and MARRIED,

all variables that

the fertility model stated represent various opportunity
costs, were found insignificant.

In other words,

the

margin of error was high enough that the effect was not
significantly different from zero.
MARRIED,

For TRAVEL, WHITE,

the margin of error was high enough that the

effect is possibly opposite of what was hypothesized.
TRAVEL,

and

For

if her miles traveled were to increase by 10, the

probability that she will defer her abortion decreases by
.09 percentage points,

ceteris p a r a b u s .
or widowed,

Being married

rather than single,

divorced,

probability by 3 7%,

from 6.7% to 4.2% that a woman will

have her abortion past 12 weeks,

decreases the

all else held constant.

If a woman has a household income of $15,000 or less,
the probability that she will defer her abortion is 5.4%.
If she is in a higher income bracket,

that probability

increases by 1.8 percentage points to 7.2%,
constant.

all else held
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The probability that a woman will defer her abortion
past the 12*^^ week decreases from 5% to 7.1% if she has a
wage-earning job,

ceteris para.hus.

rather than of African-American,
or Asian descent,
from 6.7% to 6.4%,

When a woman is w h i t e ,

Hispanic, Native American,

the probability that she defers decreases
a 4% change,

ceteris p a r a h u s ,

Given that the coefficients of the various cost
variables were found insignificant,

it appears that the

economic costs in this model are not relevant to the timing
of the decision.

Further, by associating the costs of

mandatory delay laws with the economic costs in this model,
these results indicate that abortion regulations do not
affect abortion timing.
These results, which indicate that costs imposed by
mandatory delay laws do not affect when a woman has her
abortion,

do not follow Althaus and Henshaw's study of

Mississippi's mandatory delay laws and gestational ages.
They observed an increase in gestational ages when a
mandatory delay law was imposed.

It is quite possible that

determining how abortion regulations affect abortion timing
by inferring from the effects of other economic costs is
not a suitable way to measure regulatory effects.
As noted in Chapter 2, it is not persuasive to
presume,

as Medoff does,

that the net increase in the full
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cost of an abortion which would result from making abortion
illegal can be captured by the estimated 50% increase in
price.

In this the same way, TRAVEL may not be a suitable

proxy variable for the costs imposed by a mandatory delay
law.

The time cost associated with traveling long

distances might only be a small portion of the economic
costs that a mandatory delay law would potentially impose.
Without Montana abortion regulations.

Blue Mountain

Clinic's clients who travel relatively far distances
typically do not stay overnight in Missoula but drive there
in the early m o r n i n g . I f

a mandatory delay law required

women to meet with their provider on two different
occasions,

it would automatically require a two day visit

in Missoula.

This would entail staying overnight or

traveling twice to the clinic.

Other opportunity costs

that would potentially increase are days missed from work;
if the client is under eighteen,
more school;

secretly arranging to miss

and the psychological cost of being required

to prolong the abortion process.

Personal experience working at Blue Mountain Clinic.
Provider availability complicates the matter further.
If a
woman is required to meet with her doctor on both visits, the
time required to get an abortion may be more than two days.
Blue
Mountain Clinic's providers have private practices and are
typically available for abortions one day a week.
In this case,
a woman would meet with her physician one day and the following
week return for the abortion, lengthening the time it takes to
get the abortion by five days.

51
The fact that the variables of this model representing
various economic costs were not found statistically
significant indicates that these particular economic costs
do not affect whether Blue Mountain Clinic's abortion
clients defer their procedures until the 13^^ week L M P .
Because abortion regulations represent an economic cost,

it

seems logical to deduce how abortion regulations affect
when a woman has her procedure.

However,

given that

Medoff's interpretation of the possible effects of
prohibiting abortion from his price variable seemed to
undervalue how women would respond to such legislation and
that Althaus and Henshaw illustrated a contrary result,

it

may not be appropriate to interpret how the economic cost
of abortion regulation affects abortion timing.
The statistically significant variables COLLEGEl,
PREVAB and TEEN represent various levels of experience that
determine how quickly a woman gathers the fertility cost
information.

Everything else held constant,

going to

college for at least one year decreases the probability
that a woman will defer her abortion by 77%, or a decrease
from 11.1% to 2.5%.

This dramatic decrease indicates that

a woman's college experience,

which arguably provides her

with skills conducive to gathering fertility information,
reduces the time it takes for her to get an abortion.
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The probability that a woman who has had a previous
abortion will defer her abortion is 6.5 percentage points
lower,

or 79% less,

procedure,

than for a woman who has not had the

ceteris p a r a b u s .

This indicates that a woman

who has had at least one previous abortion takes less time
to have another one, presumably because she has already
gathered and weighed the fertility information.
she makes the decision again,

Thus, when

she need not take the same

amount of time.
When the woman having an abortion is a teenager,

the

probability that she will have her abortion past 12 weeks
LMP is 15% while the probability that a woman older than 17
will defer is 5%,

The probability,

then,

increases by 200%

when the woman having the abortion is younger than 18,
ceteris parabus.

Quite possibly,

teenagers lack the

experience that calling an abortion facility or other
services,

such as pregnancy counseling, would require.

Lacking this experience,

it seems they postpone or put off

taking the initiative to get the cost information,
lengthening the time it takes for them to decide on
abortion.
The fact that COLLEGEl,

PREVAB and TEEN, which all

signify a woman's ability to gather relevant fertility cost
information,

all demonstrate strong effects on abortion
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timing indicates that this is should be an area of concern
for those who provide this relevant information-

In terms

of facilities that provide abortions and organizations that
provide pregnancy and adoption services,

the more readily

available and thorough the cost information is, the easier
it is for women to learn about it and,
faster they will do s o .

therefore,

the

Since teenagers noticeably differ

by having their abortions past the 12^^ week

(LMP), it seems

that they are less adept at learning the relevant
information and would possibly benefit from learning skills
with which they could navigate fertility information.^^

Providing cost information in a nonjudgmental manner is,
arguably, also a way to make it easily accessible.
52 One example of how to do this is Blue Mountain Clinic's
Healthapalooza Festival.
This annual event is specifically
designed to provide teenagers the opportunity to learn about
important reproductive information.
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CHAPTER 5
CONCLUSION

This chapter summarizes the hypothesis and results of
this study and makes suggestions for further research on
the topic of abortion timing.

Summary
In 1991,

the Supreme Court permitted states to impose

abortion regulations on women so long as such restrictions
did not interfere with a woman's ability to have the
abortion.

Although states vary in which,

regulations they impose,

if any,

typical state regulations include

mandatory delay l a ws, parental consent laws,

and

restrictions on Medicaid funding.
As

abor t i o n rates

c h a n g e o v e r time,

b e e n using demand analysis
restrictions,
demand

as w e l l

for a b o r t i o n .

a b o r t i o n r a t e s do,
costs.

economists have

to a s s e s s w h e t h e r

state

as o t h e r e c o n o m i c costs,
Their results have

in fact,

decrease

the

s h o w n that

r e s p o n d to c h a n g e s

in e c o n o m i c
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Another relevant abortion issue amenable to economic
analysis is what determines when a woman has the procedure.
Do economic costs affect the timing of abortion?
specifically,
laws,

do state regulations,

More

like mandatory delay

defer when a woman has her abortion?

This thesis

studied this question by using the economic theory of
fertility to analyze the timing element of the abortion
decision.
According to the abortion demand model,

the decision

to have an abortion is made by weighing the costs and
benefits of having an abortion versus having a child.

It

was hypothesized here that making this decision takes a
certain amount of time.

This amount of time is determined

by both how long it takes to gather the information on the
costs of abortion and having the child as well as the
degree of difference between these costs.
Using a logit model,

this study estimated the

probability that a woman defers her abortion past the 12^^
week LMP based on a set of economic and sociological
factors.

These factors included whether a woman has had a

previous abortion

(PREVAB), if a woman has completed at

least a year of college

(COLLEGEl), her race

whether she was under the age of eighteen
Variables

that

r e p r e s e n t e d an e c o n o m i c

(WHITE), and

(TEEN).

c os t w e r e

the m i l e s
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a woman traveled to the clinic
employed
income

(LFP), her marital status

(MARRIED), and her

(INCOME).

In the analysis,

all the coefficients for the economic

variables were insignificant,
abortion timing is minimal.
TEEN,

(TRAVEL), whether she was

COLLEGEl,

and PREVAB,

implying that their impact on
The three significant results,

all represented characteristics

that illustrate a woman's ability to gather the relevant
abortion information.
In terms of the abortion timing hypothesis,

it appears

that what determines when a woman has her abortion is not
the set of economic costs she faces but her ability to
learn about such costs.

What this suggests about state

regulations that impose,

at the very least,

a time cost is

that they do not deter abortions into the later part of the
first trimester.

Suggestions for Further Research
Given that Althaus and Henshaw's results,

that

mandatory delay laws do affect the gestational age at which
a woman aborts her pregnancy,
reported here,

are contrary to the results

the hypothesis that when a woman has her

abortion is determined by a set of economic and social
factors deserves further attention.

This study used data
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for one state for one year while no abortion regulations
were in place.

The sociological study was conducted for

one year for Mississippi and its adjacent states.
time,

In that

the mandatory delay law was imposed and the effects

of that change were examined.

For further research on

abortion timing in economics,

it would be sensible to

conduct a study analogous to the Mississippi study.
other words,

In

analyze the gestational ages of terminated

pregnancies in a state which first has no mandatory delay
law in effect and then imposes one.

This would directly

measure the effects of abortion regulations on when a woman
has an abortion,

analysis not possible given this data set.

Another possibility for examining the effect of state
regulation on abortion timing would be to conduct a mult i
state study,

as Medoff and Garbacz both did in their

abortion demand research,

and include a dummy variable for

the presence of mandatory delay laws.

In this case,

the

average gestational age in each state could be measured as
a function of, among other factors,

the presence or absence

of state mandatory delay laws.
In order to examine the effects of parental consent
laws on teenag ers ' abortion timing,
regression for teenagers,

one could do a separate

similar to Garbacz's.

it was conducted nationwide,

Again,

a dummy variable would be

if
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included for the presence of parental consent laws.
Alternatively,

if research on teenagers is conducted for

one state, as was suggested for studying effects of
mandatory delay laws, a time-series study would be
appropriate,

one that examines the before and after effects

of a parental consent law.
In this particular study, a binary logit model
statistically estimated the probability that a woman
deferred her abortion past the 12 week LMP-

How the

independent variables affect gestational ages could also be
measured by doing a multinomial logit model, in which the
dependent variable Y has more than 2 categories.

This

model would provide for more explanation because it would
define the dependent variable in less definitive terms.

Concluding Remarks
Abortions that are performed both late in the first
trimester and in the second trimester are of great concern
given the increased medical risk associated with such
procedures.

These results demonstrated that, although the

economic costs analyzed do not seem relevant to when a
woman aborts her pregnancy, women who are relatively less
adept at acquiring important fertility information are more
likely to defer their procedures.
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When a woman has her abortion is a topic that has not
been thoroughly considered in either sociology or
economics.

Given that many argue the restrictions states

impose on women who seek abortions place them at medical
risk and that Althaus and H e n s h a w 's results are so contrary
to the results found here,

the question of what determines

why some women defer their abortions is clearly not
answered and continuing research on this issue seems
imperative in order to do so.
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APPENDIX A
HISTORY OF SUPREME COURT DECISIONS REGARDING REPRODUCTIVE
RIGHTS^^

Griswold v. Connecticut,
By a vote of 1-2,

381 U.S. 479

(1965)

the Supreme Court invalidated a

Connecticut statute that prohibited the use of
co ntr aceptives, holding that the statute violated the
constitutional right to marital privacy.

Eisenstadt v. Baird,
By a vote of 6-1,

405 U.S.

438

(1972)

the Court invalidated a law

prohibiting the distribution of contraceptives to unmarried
people,

holding that the constitutional right to privacy

extends to the reproductive decisions of both married and
unmarried people.

Roe

V.

Wade,

By a vote of 7-2,

410 U.S.

113

(1973)

the Court invalidated a Texas law

prohibiting abortions not necessary to save the woman's
life. The Court held that the fundamental right to privacy
extends to a woman's decision whether or not to have an
abortion and that any governmental interference with that

This information was obtained by the National Abortion Rights
Action League website www.naral.org/publications/facts/sup.html.
on April 23, 2000.
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right is subject to strict judicial scrutiny. The Court
recognized two compelling state interests sufficient to
justify restrictions on a woman's right to choose.

States

may regulate the abortion procedure after the first
trimester of pregnancy in ways necessary to promote a
woman's health. After the point of fetal viability —
approximately 24 to 2 8 weeks -- a state may,

to protect the

potential life of the fetus, prohibit abortions not
necessary to preserve the woman's life or health.

Doe

V.

Bolton,

410 U.S.

179

(1973)

Decided with Roe v. Wade. By a vote of 7-2,

the Court

invalidated provisions of a Georgia law that required that
(1)

any abortion be performed in a hospital;

(2) a woman

secure the approval of three physicians and a hospital
committee before obtaining an abortion;

and

(3) a woman

seeking to obtain an abortion be a resident of the state.

Bigelow v. Virginia,
By a vote of 7-2,

421 U.S.

809

(1975)

the Court invalidated the

application of a Virginia statute that prohibited the
advertisement of abortion services.
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Connecticut v. Menillo,

423 U.S.

9 (1975)

The Court unanimously upheld the use of a Connecticut
statute that prohibited the performance of abortion to
prosecute a non-physician.

Bellotti

V.

Baird

(I), 428 U.S.

132

(1976)

The Court unanimously ruled that the district court
should have abstained from deciding the constitutionality
of a Massachusetts statute requiring parental consent until
the state court had interpreted the statute. The Court
noted,

however that a state may,

in some circumstances,

require a minor woman to obtain parental consent before
obtaining an abortion.

Planned Parenthood of Central Missouri v. Danforth,
U.S. 52 (1976)
By a vote of 6-3,
a Missouri statute that

42 8

the Court invalidated provisions of
(1) required a married woman to

obtain the consent of her husband prior to obtaining an
abortion;

(2) required a physician to preserve the life and

health of the fetus at every stage of pregnancy;

and

(3)

prohibited the use of saline amniocentesis as a method of
abortion.

By a vote of 5-4,

the Court struck down a

requirement that an unmarried minor woman obtain the
written consent of one parent before obtaining an abortion
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because the statute provided no alternative to parental
consent such as judicial waiver of the consent requirement.
The Court upheld provisions that
keep confidential records,

(1) required facilities to

available only for statistical

purposes to public health officials,

intended to preserve

maternal health and life by increasing medical knowledge
and to monitor whether abortions are performed in
accordance with the law;

(2) required that a woman sign a

consent form prior to an abortion;

and

(3) defined

"viability" as "that stage of fetal development when the
life of the unborn child may be continued indefinitely
outside the womb by natural or artificial life-supportive
s y s t e m s ."

Maher v. Roe,
By a vote of 6-3,

432 U.S.

464

(1977)

the Court upheld a Connecticut

prohibition of the use of public funds for abortions,
except those "medically necessary," even though the state
provides funding for childbirth.
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Beal

V.

Doe,

432 U.S. 438

(1977)

Decided with Maher v. Roe. By a vote of 6-3,

the Court

upheld a Pennsylvania regulation that prohibited the use of
public funds for abortions not "medically necessary."

Poelker v. Doe,

432 U.S.

By a vote of 6-3, pe r curiam,

519

(1977)

the Court upheld the

refusal of a public hospital to provide publicly funded
abortions when there was no threat to the health or life of
the w o m a n .

Carey v. Population Services,431 U.S.
By a vote of 7-2,

678

(1977)

the Court invalidated a New York law

prohibiting the sale or distribution of contraceptives to
minors.

Colautti

V.

Franklin,

By a vote of 6-3,

439 U.S.

379

(1979)

the Court invalidated as

unconstitutionally vague a Pennsylvania statute that
required a physician,

under threat of criminal penalties,

to use the method and "degree of care" most likely to
preserve the life and health of the fetus if the physician
determined the fetus was viable or had "sufficient reason
to believe that the fetus may be viable."
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Bellotti

V.

Baird

(II), 443 U.S.

622

(1979)

By a vote of 8-1, the Court invalidated a
Massachusetts law that required a minor to obtain the
consent of both parents before obtaining an abortion.

Four

Justices reasoned that the procedure for judicial waiver
was unconstitutional because it required parental
consultation in every case before the minor woman was
permitted to go to court to demonstrate that she was mature
enough to make her own decision or that an abortion was in
her best interests.

Four other Justices considered the

statute unconstitutional because it provided an absolute
veto over a minor woman's abortion decision to a thirdparty, whether a parent or a judge.

Harris v. McRae,
By a vote of 5-4,

448 U.S.

297

(1980)

the Court upheld the Hyde amendment,

which prohibits the use of federal funds for abortions not
necessary to preserve the woman's life. The Court also held
that states that participate in the Medicaid program are
not required by Title XIX of the Social Security Act to
fund medically necessary abortions for which federal funds
are unavailable under the Hyde amendment.
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Williams v. Zbaraz, 448 U.S.

358

(1980)

Decided with Harris v. McRae. By a vote of 5-4, the
Court upheld an Illinois statute prohibiting the use of
state funds for abortions not necessary to save the woman's
life.

H.L.

V.

Matheson,

450 U.S.

398

(1981)

By a vote of 6-3, the Court upheld as not invalid on
its face a Utah statute requiring a physician to notify a
minor woman's parent before performing an abortion,

but the

Court did not decide whether the statute would be
unconstitutional as applied to a mature minor because the
plaintiff had not alleged that she was mature.

City of Akron v. Akron Center for Reproductive Health,
U.S. 416 (1983)

4 62

By a vote of 6-3, the Court invalidated those
provisions of a city ordinance that

(1) required physicians

to give their patients anti-abortion information,
telling them that

including

"the unborn child is a human life from

the moment of conception;" (2) required a 24-hour waiting
period following these lectures;

(3) mandated that all

abortions after the first trimester be performed in a
hospital;

(4) required parental consent for a minor woman

to obtain an abortion, without providing a procedure for
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waiver of the consent requirement;

and

(5) required

physicians to dispose of fetal remains in an unspecified
"humane and sanitary manner."

Planned Parenthood Association of Kansas City, Mo. v.
Ashcroft, 462 U.S. 476 (1983)
Decided with Akron Center.

By a vote of 6-3,

the Court

invalidated a provision of a Missouri statute that required
all second-trimester abortions to be performed in a
hospital.
that

By a vote of 5-4,

the Court upheld requirements

(1) a second physician be present during a p o st

viability abortion;

(2) a minor woman obtain either

parental consent or a judicial w a i v e r ; and

(3) a pathology

report be made for each abortion.

Simopoulos

V.

By a vote of 8-1,

Virginia,

462 U.S.

506

(1983)

the Court affirmed the criminal

conviction of a physician for performing a second-trimester
abortion outside a licensed hospital,

noting that

Virginia's definition of "hospital" differed from
Missouri's and Akron's in that it included "outpatient
h o s p i t a l s , " and was therefore broad enough to include any
adequately equipped clinic. Thus,

the Court held that the

Virginia restriction on abortions after the first trimester
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was necessary to promote the health of women obtaining
abortions.

Thornburgh v. American College of Obstetricians and
Gynecologists, 476 U.S. 747 (1986)
By a vote of 5-4,

the Court invalidated provisions of

a Pennsylvania statute that required

(1) physicians to give

their patients anti-abortion information,

including

pictures of fetuses at various stages of development,
discourage them from obtaining abortions;
detailed reports,

to

(2) the filing of

available to the public for copying,

including identification of the attending physician and
information about the woman obtaining an abortion;

(3) a

physician performing a post-viability abortion to use that
"degree of care" required to preserve the life and health
of any unborn child intended to be born and to use the
method of abortion most likely to preserve the life of the
fetus,

even at some risk to a w o m a n ’s health;

and

(4) the

presence of a second physician at post-viability abortions
without providing an exception for a medical emergency.
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Webster v. Reproductive Health Services,
(1989)

492 U.S.

490

By a vote of 5-4, the Court upheld provisions of a
Missouri statute prohibiting the use of public facilities
or public personnel to perform abortions and requiring a
physician to make determinations and perform tests
concerning gestational age, weight and lung maturity when
he or she has reason to believe a woman to be 2 0 weeks or
more pregnant.

For the first time in the sixteen years

since Roe v. Wade,

only a minority of the Justices on the

Court -- four Justices -- voted to reaffirm Roe.

Hodgson v. M i n ne sota , 497 U.S.
By a vote of 5-4,

417

(1990)

the Court invalidated as having no

rational basis a Minnesota law requiring notification of
both parents without a procedure for judicial waiver of the
notice requirement.

However,

by a vote of 5-4,

the Court

upheld another provision that required two-parent
notification but included a procedure for judicial waiver,
as well as a 48-hour waiting period for minors.
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Ohio y. Akron Center for Reproductive Health,
(1990)
By a vote of 6-3,

497 U.S.

502

the Court upheld an Ohio statute

that required a minor woman to notify one parent or obtain
a judicial waiver,

rejecting a facial challenge alleging

that the burdensome judicial procedure did not fulfill the
constitutional requirement of a meaningful bypass
procedure.

Rust

V.

Sullivan,

500 U.S.

173

(1991)

By a vote of 5-4, the Court upheld federal regulations
prohibiting health care professionals at family planning
clinics that receive Title X funds from counseling or
referring women regarding abortion,

or even informing a

pregnant patient that abortion is a legal option.
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Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey,
505 U.S. 833 (1992)
By a vote of 1-2,

the Court upheld provisions of a

Pennsylvania statute that required

(1) physicians to

provide patients with anti-abortion information,

including

pictures of fetuses at various stages of development,
discourage women from obtaining abortions;
24-hour delay following these lectures;
reports,

to

(2) a mandatory

(3) the filing of

available for public inspection and copying,

including the name and location of any facility performing
abortions that receives any state funds ; and

(4) a one-

parent consent requirement for minors with a judicial
bypass.

The Court explicitly overruled parts of Akron and

Thornburgh.

The plurality opinion of three Justices

abandoned the strict scrutiny standard of review applied to
fundamental rights for a less protective

"undue burden"

standard of review, which these restrictions passed. Two
Justices voted to continue to protect the right to choose
as a fundamental right under Roe by subjecting state
restrictions to strict scrutiny.

These five Justices voted

to strike down a provision that barred a married woman from
obtaining an abortion unless she notified her husband.
Justices voted to uphold all challenged provisions and
overturn Roe completely,

stating that it was wrongly

Four
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decided and the Constitution does not protect the right to
choose.

Bray v. Alexandria Women's Health Clinic,
(1993)

506 U.S.

263

By a vote of 5-4, the Court held that a federal civil
rights law,
1985(3),

known as the "Ku Klux K l a n " Act,

42 U.S.C.

§

does not protect women from anti-choice blockaders

obstructing access to reproductive health clinics. The
Court held that anti-choice blockades do not constitute
sex-based discrimination for the purpose of the statute.

National Organization for Women v. Scheidler,
(1994)
By a vote of 9-0,

510 U.S.

249

the Court held that claims under the

Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations
do not require proof of an economic motive,
National Organization for Women

(RICO) act

and that the

(NOW) and a group of

women's health centers could pursue their civil suit
against Joseph Scheidler,
(PLAN)

the Pro-Life Action Network

and others anti-choice clinic blockaders.

Madsen v. Women's Health Center,

512 U.S.

753

(1994)

By a vote of 5-4 the Court upheld provisions of a
Florida injunction that

(1) created a 36-foot buffer zone

outside the entrance to a reproductive health clinic;

and
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(2)

prohibited anti-choice protesters from making noise

that could be heard by patients inside the clinic during
the hours in which surgical procedures were performed.

The

Court noted that such injunctions burden "no more speech
than necessary to serve a significant government interest."
The court invalidated provisions creating a 300-foot
approach"

zone around the clinic,

a ban on signs and images

visible to people inside the clinic,
picketing outside the residences

Schenck v. Pro-Choice Network,
By a vote of 8-1,

"no

and a 300-foot ban on

of clinic employees.

117 S. C t . 855

(1997)

the Court invalidated the provision

in a New York injunction that created a 15-foot "floating"
buffer zone around any person or vehicle seeking access to
or leaving a clinic. The Court held that the "floating"
buffer zones "burden more speech than necessary to serve
the relevant government interests." The Court limited this
holding to the facts of this case and noted that it did not
address

"whether the governmental interests involved would

ever justify some sort of zone of separation between
individuals entering the clinics

and protestors,

as

measured by the distance between

the two." By a vote of 6-

3, the Court upheld a provision creating a 15-foot

"fixed"

buffer zone outside of clinic doorways,

and

driveways,
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parking lot entrances.
desist" provision

The Court

also upheld a "cease and

that permits two "sidewalk counselors" to

approach a person inside the"fixed" buffer zones unless and
until the person indicates a desire for the counselor to
withdraw;

the "sidewalk counselor" must then retreat 15

feet from the person he/she had been counseling and remain
outside of the buffer zone.

Mazurek v. Armstrong,

117 S. C t . 1865

By a vote of

6-3, the Court

ruling that would

have permitted

(1997)

reversed alower court
health care providers to

move forward with their challenge to a Montana law banning
the performance of abortion by licensed physician
assistants working under the supervision of a doctor.
Without full briefing or oral argument,
that,

the Court found

in general, physician-only requirements are

constitutional. As the Court's first application of the
"undue burden"

standard since Planned Parenthood of

Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey,

this decision indicates

that the standard is less protective than it initially
appeared and that regardless of a l a w ’s intended effect,
the Court will not invalidate state restrictions on
abortion before viability unless the actual effect is to
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create a substantial obstacle on women obtaining an
abortion.
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APPENDIX B
CURRENT STATUS OF STATE ABORTION LAWS

TABLE B.l
RESTRICTIONS ON MINORS' ACCESS TO ABORTION'
State

AL
AK
AZ
AR
CA
CO
DE
GA
ID
IL
IN
lA
KS
KY
LA
ME
MD
MA
MI
MN
MS
MO
MT^
NE
NV
NM
NC

One
Two
Consent Not ice Mandatory Judicial Enjoined/ Enforced
Parent Parent
Counseling Bypass
Not
Enforced
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
XX
X
X
XX
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
XXX
X
X
X
X
X
x^
X
X
XX
X
XX
X
X
X
XX
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
XX
XX
XX
X
X
X
X
XX
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
XX
X
X
X
X
X
X
XX
X
x^
X
X
X
X
X* The information in this appendix on parental consent laws and
state funding was obtained from the National Abortion Rights
Action League website www.naral.org/publications/facts/minor.html
on April 23, 2000.
f In 1999, Montana's abortion restrictions were overturned.
See
Appendix C for a summary of Montana's current abortion
legislation status.
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ND
OH
PA
RI
SC
SD
TN
UT
VA
WV
WI
WY
Total

X
XX
X
XX
X

X
X
X
X
X
X
X

Xi
X
X
xif
X
32

X
X
X
X
X
X
X

7

X
X
XX
X
21

18

2

X
X
X
X
X
X
X-

X
X
X
X
34

X
X
X
X
X
30

9

December 19 9 8
Notes :
1. This statute has been declared unenforceable by a
court or attorney general.
2- This statute also allows consent of or notice to a
grandparent under certain circumstances.
3. This requirement may be waived by a specified health
professional under certain circumstances.
4. This statute requires notice to a minor's parents,
possible.

if

5. This statute also allows consent of or notice to a
grandparent or step-parent.
6. This statute also allows consent of an adult family
member.
7. This statute offers mandatory counseling as an
alternative to one-parent or adult family member
consent with a judicial bypass.
8. This statute, as written, requires two-parent consent,
but a court has issued an order that the law be
enforced as requiring the consent of one parent.
9. This statute also allows notice to a grandparent,
step-parent, or adult sibling over the age of 21 under
certain circumstances.
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10.This statute allows consent of or notice to a
grandparent or certain other adult family members over
the age of 25.
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TABLE B .2

State

AL
AK
AZ
AR
CA
CO
CT
DE
DC
FL
GA
HI
ID
IL
IN
lA
KS
KY
LA
ME
MD
MA
MI
MN
MS
MO
MT
NE
NV
NH
NJ
NM
NY

PUBLIC FUNDING FOR ABORTION'
Life ;
Life, Rape,
Life
Rape,
Incest, and
Endangerment
and
Some Health
Onlyl
Incest
Circumstances
Only
X
X
X
X2

All or Most
Circumstances

X3 ,7
X2
X3
X6
X
X
X
X
X3 ,6
X2 ,4
X
X5, 6
X
X2
X2 ,6
X
X6
X3 ,6
X2
X3
X
X2
X3, 6
X2
X
X
X3
X3
X

* The information on public funding was obtained from the
National Abortion Federation website
w w w . n a r a l .org/publicationsfacts/1991/public_funding■ html.
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NC
ND
OH
OK
OR
PA
RI
SC
SD
TN
TX
UT
VT
VA
WA
WV
WI
WY
Total
December 15,

X
X2
X6
X2 ,6
X3
X2, 6
X
X6
X
X
X
X2
X3
X5 ,6
X
X3
X6
2
1998

X6
30

5

14

Notes :
1. Such state policies violate federal law prohibiting
participating states from excluding abortion from the
Medicaid program in cases of life endangerment, rape,
and incest.
2 . A court has ruled that this state must comply with
federal law prohibiting the exclusion of abortion from
Medicaid in cases of rape or incest as well as life
endangerment.
3. A court has ruled that the state constitution
prohibits the state from restricting funding for
abortion while providing funds for costs associated
with childbirth.
4. A court has ruled that the state constitution
prohibits the enforcement of a state law restricting
funding to the extent it bars funding for an abortion
necessary to preserve the woman's health.
5. This statute provides funding for some cases of fetal
anomaly.
6. This state requires that cases of rape and incest be
reported to a law enforcement or social service agency
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in some circumstances in order for the woman to be
eligible for a publicly funded abortion.
7. For publicly funded abortions after 20 weeks, a
physician must certify that the fetus is nonviable or
that pregnancy would endanger the woman's life or
health.
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REQUIRED INFORMED CONSENT AND MANDATORY DELAY LAWS^

Fourteen states require a delay following state-directed
counseling before a woman may obtain an abortion:
Idaho, 2 4 hours
Indiana, 18 hours
Kansas, 24 hours
Louisiana, 24 hours
Michigan, 24 hours
Mississippi, 24 hours
Nebraska, 2 4 hours
North Dakota, 24 hours
Ohio, 2 4 hours
Pennsylvania, 2 4 hours
South Carolina, 1 hour
South Dakota, 24 hours
Utah, 2 4 hours
Wisconsin, 24 hours

In five states,
•
•
•
•
•

such requirements are enjoined:

Delaware, 2 4 hours
Kentucky, 2 4 hoursMassachusetts, 24 hours
Montana, 24 hours
Tennessee, 48-72 hours

Eight additional states require state-directed counseling
(without a mandatory delay) before a woman may obtain an
abort ion :•
•
•
•

Alaska
California
Connecticut
Maine

•

Minnesota

^ This information was obtained from The Alan Guttmacher
Institute website w w w .a g i - u s a .org/pubs/abort_law_stat.html
on April 23, 2000.
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Nevada
Rhode Island
Virginia
In two states,

such requirements are enjoined

Florida
Missouri

^ Enforcement of this law is delayed, pending resolution of
a legal challenge.
^ The provisions in these laws vary widely— from standard
informed consent requirements to prescriptive counseling
re qui rem ent s.
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APPENDIX C
A HISTORY OF MONTANA'S REPRODUCTIVE CONSTITUTIONAL
DECISIONS^
A court has ruled that the Montana Constitution
protects the right to reproductive choice as a
fundamental right and to a greater extent than the
Federal Constitution.

A court struck down under the state constitution a
regulation limiting state medical assistance for
abortion to cases of life endangerment,
incest.

Jeannette R. v. Ellery,

D i s t . C t . May 22,

1995) .

been upheld by the U.S.
Federal Constitution.

rape,

and

No. BDV-94-811

(Mont.

A similar restriction has

Supreme Court under the

Williams v. Zbaraz, 448 U.S.

358

(1980) .

A court struck down under the state constitution a law
requiring either notice to one parent or a judicial
waiver before a minor could obtain an abortion.
Wicklund v. State, N o .ADV-97-671
12,

1999)

(summary judgment).

Dist. C t . Feb.

25,

1999)

(Mont. Dist. C t . Feb.

No.ADV-97-671

(Mont.

(permanent injunction).
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appeal filed. No.
dismissed

99-311

(Mont.Nov.

court decision,

(Mont. Apr.

29,1999).

15, 1999),

Prior to this state

this law had been upheld by the U.S.

Supreme Court under the federal Constitution.
V . Wicklund,

appeal

520 U.S.

292

Lambert

(1997).

A court has struck down under the state constitution a
provision mandating a 24-hour waiting period prior to
an abortion.

Planned Parenthood of Missoula v. State,

No. BDV-95.722

(Mont. Dist. C t . Mar.

dismissed (Mont. Nov.

29,

1999),

appeal

1999) . A similar restriction

has been upheld by the U.S.
federal Constitution.

12,

Supreme Court under the

Planned Parenthood of

Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey,

505 U.S.

833

(1992) ,

A court struck down under the state constitution
provisions prohibiting certified physician assistants
from performing abortions.
BVD 97-627

Armstrong v. State, No.

(Mont. Dist. C t . D e c . 8, 1999).

this state court decision,

the U.S.

Prior to

Supreme Court held

that it was unlikely that plaintiffs would prevail on
their claim that these provisions constituted an undue

^ This summary of M o n t a n a 's reproductive legislative history was
obtained from the National Abortion Rights Action League website
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burden under the federal Constitution,
Armstrong,

520 U.S.

968

Mazurek v,

(1997).

A court struck down under the state constitution a law
banning so-called "partial-birth" abortion.
Intermountain Planned Parenthood v. State, N o .BDV 97477

(Mont. Dist.

Dist.

C t . Aug.

C t . June 29, 1998), modified

19,

1998).

(Mont.

Montana amended its law

banning so-called "partial-birth" abortion in 1999,
which has prompted a new court battle concerning the
constitutionality of such laws,
Procedures.

The U.S.

Supreme Court has yet to rule on

this issue.

WWW

.naral.org.

see Ban on Abortion

on April 23, 2000.

87
BLUE MOUNTAIN CLINIC
CONFIDENTIAL CLIENT QUESTIONNAIRE
Patient # ___________
The information is voluntary, and confidential.
We
appreciate your opinion because it helps us evaluate our
services and make changes as necessary to accommodate our
clients.
1.

Have you been a client at the Clinic before?
Yes _____
no
If so, last date _______

2. In choosing Blue Mountain Clinic for today's visit,
important were each of the following :
Not
Important

Little
Importance

Very
Important

Important

Cost of the procedure :

How soon an appointment was available :

Ease of scheduling an appointment:

Reputation of Clinic :

R e c o m m e n d a t i o n of

friend,

etc

Security of building:

Privacy :

Already

a patient

at B l u e M o u n t a i n :

3. Did you know that the Clinic provides :
a) family practice health care
yes ___
b) pediatric and adolescent health care
yes ___
c) prenatal care
yes

how

no
no
no
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C)

and naturopathic medicine
yes
e) m e n t a l h e a l t h c o u n s e l i n g
yes
f ) massage therapy
ves
yes
g) v a s e c t o m i e s
h) a c u p u n c t u r e
yes
osteopathic

no
no
no
no
no

4. How far did you travel to get h e r e (one-way)?

5. How did you pay for today's visit: Check all that apply.
Personal Savings _____
Advanced Wages _____
Credit card _____
Pawned Something _____
Family/Friend _____
Car Loan _____
Cashed a Post
Other ______
Dated Check _____
6.

Do you currently have medical insurance?
yes ______
no__
If yes y will you be billing your insurance for today's
visit?
yes _______
no_____
6. Please evaluate your experience today.
STRONGLY AGREE
STRONGLY DISAGREE
The Doctor:
a)exhibited competence and professional skill

b)treated me with respect
d) answered my questions clearly

The Nurses :
a)exhibited competence and professional skill

b)treated me with respect

c) answered my questions clearly

AGREE
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The Counselor:
a)listened to me
b)answered my questions clearly
c)explained the abortion procedure clearly
d) established a trusting and comfortable
relationship with me

7. Are you: (Circle one)
single
married
separated
divorced
widowed
8. Are you: (Circle one)
White
Native Amer.
Asian
Hispanic
Other__________
9. Highest grade completed in school:
11 12
10.

Number of years of college:

11.

Are you employed?
yes ____
no______
If yes, do you work (please circle) full time
time
full year
part year

12.

13.

Is your
(Circle
Is your
(Circle

0 12

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9

3 4 5+

partner employed?
one) full time
part time
partner a student?
one)
full time
part time

Are you a student?
(Circle one)
full time

10

part-time

part

no
no

no

14.
Check the space provided to indicate your household
income :
Under $5,00 0/year _____
$5,001-$15,000/year _____
$15001-$25,000/year _____
$2 5,001-$35,000/year _____
$35,001-$45,000/year _____
$45,001 -$5 5,000/year _____
$55,0 01- $65 ,000/year _____
$Over $65,0 00/year _____
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15.

Number of people supported by your household income
(Circle one) 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
8+

Thank you so much for taking the time to fill out this
survey.
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APPENDIX E
STATISTICAL DESCRIPTION OF ABORTION CLIENTS^

Age
Blue Mountain Clinic's abortion clients ranged from
ages 15 to 46.

The average client was 25.13 years old and

22 year olds represented the largest percentage of clients
(9.5%).

The median age was 24 and standard deviation 6.71.

Of the applicable 295 patients,

8.5% were minors.

Nineteen

percent were in their thirties and 3% were in their
forties.

^See Chapter 4 for a thorough discussion of INCOME'S statistical
distribution.
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Bar Chart E .1
Age Distribution

15

AGE

17

19

21

23

25

27

29

31

33

35

37

39

41

43
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Ethnicity
Almost 91% of Blue Mountain Clinic's clients were
white. Approximately 7 percent
1.3%

(4) Hispanic,

.6%

(23) were Native American,

(2) Black,

.3%

(1) Asian.

Of the

patients that were under 18, 91.7% were white and 8.3% were
Native American. Almost 90% of those 18 and older were
white.

Approximately 7.5% were Native American,

Hispanic,

.8% Black,

1.6%

and .4% Asian.

Marital Status
All of the clients between the ages of 15 and 17 were
unmarried. Approximately 68% of those 18 and over were
single.

Seventeen percent were married,

4% percent were

separated and 10.9% were divorced.

Employment
Seventy-five percent of Blue Mountain Clinic's
patients reported employment. Amongst those wage-earners,
63.1% worked full-time while the remaining worked parttime. Considering clients aged 23 and over,
employed and,

of those,

82.5% were

74.3% worked full-time.

E d u c a t ion
Amongst
school.

clients

Almost

over

18, 92% h a d g r a d u a t e d from h i g h

70% h a d a t t e n d e d at least one y e a r of
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college.

Although they were not asked whether they held a

college degree,

the clients did indicate the number of

years of college they attended.
college years attended was 1.92.

The average number of
Twenty-four percent

attended at least four years of college, possibly earning a
college degree.

Almost 10% of those surveyed have attended

5 or more years of college.
Amongst patients older than 18,

30.9% indicated that

they were currently attending post-secondary school.
those,

Of

74% were attending school full-time and the

remaining were attending part-time.

Eighty percent of

clients attending school were between the ages of 19-24.
Eleven percent were between 2 5 and 29.
30-35.
client

Seven percent were

No clients aged 35-40 were attending school.

One

(2%) aged 46 was attending post-secondary school.

Previous Pregnancies
Half of all clients surveyed have been pregnant
before.

The maximum number of previous pregnancies,

includes live births,

abortions,

The average number was 1.40.

which

and miscarriages, was 9.

Amongst those older than 18,

64.2% have had previous pregnancies and 1.5 8 was the
average number.

For clients between the ages of 15 and 18,
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22% have been pregnant before.

The largest number of

pregnancies was 2 and the average was
Amongst all clients surveyed,
child.

.25.

44% have at least one

The average number of children was

maximum number was six.

.86 and the

For clients younger than 18, one

was the maximum number of children and 11.1% had one child.
Amongst all patients,
abortion.
average was

44% had had at least one

The highest number of abortions was 5 and the
.53.

Amongst women over 18, approximately 37%

had terminated a pregnancy and 27% had terminated just one
pregnancy.

The average number of abortions was

those 18 and younger,

.47.

Of

the maximum number of abortions was

1, 11% had terminated a pregnancy and .11 was the average.

Gestational Age
For all clients surveyed,

the gestational ages

(LMP)

at the time of abortion ranged from 3.5 to 14.5 weeks.
most common week of termination
median was 7 weeks,

and the average was 8.0 67 weeks.

women above 18 years old,
weeks.

(20.7%) was 7 weeks,

The

the
For

the mode and median were still 7

The average gestational age was 7.824.

Only 1.5%

of these patients terminated their pregnancy at either 14
or 14.5 weeks.

For patients between ages 15 and 19,

largest percentage

the

(14%) terminated their pregnancy at 14

96
weeks.

The average gestational age was 9.472 and the

median was 9 w e e k s .

Health Insurance
Approximately 56% of clients surveyed had health
insurance of some kind.

Of those insured,

a claim to pay for their abortion.

81% did not file

Fifty-five percent of

clients above 18 were insured and 82.6% of those clients
did not file a claim with their insurance company.
clients 18 and younger,

Amongst

63.2% were insured and 87.5% did

not attempt to pay for their abortion with insurance.

Travel Cost
Of the clients surveyed,
clients

94.6% lived in Montana.

(3.3%) were Idaho residents.

Six

Ten

(2%) were from

other states but were presumably in Missoula for other
reasons besides terminating their pregnancy.
from Montana,

Of clients

35.9% were Missoulians.

The average number of miles a client traveled to Blue
Mountain Clinic was 91.

The median number of miles was 57

and the standard deviation 94.651. The maximum number of
miles a Montana client traveled was 711.7.
approximately 5 miles.

The minimum was

The average Montana resident

traveled 87.23 and the standard deviation was 94 miles.
The minimum number of miles an Idaho patient traveled was
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134.1.

The maximum was 311.3.

The average number of miles

an Idaho resident traveled was 178.6 and the standard
deviation was 65.465.

How They Paid
The patients were asked to distinguish how they paid
for at least part of their procedure.
payment included savings,
or family member,
check advance,
possession.

Their methods of

credit card, help from a friend

borrowing money "against" their car, pay

a post-dated check,

and pawning a

Over half of the clients paid for their

abortions with savings.

Thirty-three percent paid with

help from friends or family.
portion on their credit card.
other choices,

Almost 18% put at least a
Approximately 11% specified

half of which were taking out a loan.

percent took an advance on their paycheck.
options mentioned,
a check,

Three

The remaining

borrowing against their car, post-dating

and pawning a possession were each only checked by

three clients.
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Preferences
The clients were provided possible reasons for
deciding to have their abortion at Blue Mountain Clinic and
were asked to value them on levels of importance,
important to not important.
availability,
privacy.

from very

Their choices were cost,

ease of scheduling,

reputation,

security,

and

Almost 74% of those surveyed indicated that

privacy was very important in their decision.

Sixty-two

percent deemed the clinic's reputation as highly important.
Availability was very important to 57% of the patients.
Forty-six percent felt that the ease of scheduling was very
important and 42% stated security.
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